He [J. L. Austin] might argue that if our ordinary use of 'can' really does enshrine an indeterminist belief, so much the worse for it. You might as well argue that the heliocentric hypothesis is false on the grounds that it conflicts with the traditional beliefs enshrined in the phrase 'terra firma.' To be sure, he must now give up the claim that he is only analyzing 'can' as it is traditionally used. But this would not trouble him much. Our actual use of the word 'can,' he will now say, enshrines a false belief, and the sooner we get rid of it the better.
To accept the possibility of Austin's example and the interpretation he puts on it is to reject the thesis that 'he can' in this sort of case means 'he always does, if...'; but it invites, and I shall try to show that it requires, the thesis that 'he can' means 'he usually does, if...' This would be a crucial, indeed a fatal change, if the issue were between determinism and indeterminism; but it is not; the issue is the possibility of an hypothetical analysis of 'can.' Let us agree for the moment that an ability is inherently liable not to produce success, on occasion, and that for no reason. It is also inherently liable to produce success, at least on most occasions. If you miss an occasional three-foot putt, your ability to hole three-foot putts may not be in doubt; but if you miss too many, you lack the ability. 'He can,' then, implies 'he usually succeeds, if he tries'; and equally, though one success might be a fluke, 'he usually succeeds, if he tries' implies 'he can.'
From P. H. Nowell Smith, "Ifs and Cans," Theoria, XXVI, Part 2 (1960), pp.85-101. A reply to J. L. Austin: Ifs and Cans. British Academy Lecture, Oxford University Press, 1956.
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